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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1952-53 TERM
dence, inside or outside the writing, that it is intended to be a
settlement by which his child would be provided for after his
death. The first two requirements are concurred in by the ma-
jority. It was only -with his third requirement that they differed.
Judge Desmond's application was too strict and in cases such as
the instant one the results would prove inequitable. His term
"weighty evidence" should include the surrounding circumstances
so that testator's intent may be shown by the relationship of the
amount of his estate and the amount given to each legatee under
the will. Only in this manner will it be possible to avoid the injus-
tice of providing the after-born child with a sum out of proportion
to that received by the other children living at the time of the
execution of the will. This inequitable result surely would not be
the intent of a testator.
Substitution of Executor for Testator
In Humbeutet v. HumbeuteZ,3 the testator, who had been the
plaintiff in the action, had recovered a judgment from her son di-
recting him to pay over to her certain amounts of cash and securi-
ties in his possession. After the testator's death, her executor
moved to amend the final judgment requiring the son to deliver
the cash and securities to the executor. The nunc pro tunc amend-
ment made to substitute the executor for the testator was held
valid by the Court of Appeals.
There should be no reason, in the light that the executor is
the continuing personality of the testator 34 and that a judgment
may be amended to conform to the actual state of facts,35 that a
court should not be justified in allowing the amendment nunc pro
tunc so that the executor can settle the estate of the deceased in
the most expedient manner possible. There would be little reason
in holding that the executor must establish his right to possession
of the property when the right of the deceased has been already
established and he is that person in the eyes of the law.
33. 305 N. Y. 159. lII N. E. 2d 429 (1953).
34. C. P. A. § 84, "In the case of the death of a sole plaintiff or a sole defendant,
if the cause of action survives or continues, the court, upon a motion, must allow or
compel the action to be continued by or against his representative or successor in inter-
est"; see also § 557 (3), "Where the adverse party has died since the making of the
order or the rendering of the judgment appealed from or where the judgment appealed
from was rendered after his death, in a case prescribed by law, an appeal may be taken
as if he were living, but it cannot be heard until the heir, devisee, executor or adminis-
trator, as the case requires, has been substituted."
35. Herpe v. Herpe, 225 N. Y. 323, 122 N. E. 204 (1919); followed in Core v.
Hoffman, 256 N. Y. 254, 176 N. E. 383 (1931) ; see also, C. P. A. § 105.
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